the primary reasons for imposing ceilings on deposit interest rates was to reduce the number of Jailing banks by reducing their interest cost. Another objective was to reduce the incentives Ibr rural banks to hold large interest-earning balances with their correspondents in the financial centers.
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Much of the concern in the early l 93 Os centered on interest payments on demand deposits. Interest payments on demand deposits were prohibited under the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. The maximum interest rate on all time and savings deposits was initially set at 3 percent, slightly below the average interest rate that commercial banks kind thrift institutions had been paying on time an(l savings deposits, but chore then-existing market yields on high-grade short-tenn securities. 3 The choice of the initial ceiling rate on time and savings deposits indicates that the purpose of these ceiling rates on time and savings deposits was itot to keep them heloxv yields on alternative investments, but to reduce deposit rates slightly and thus lower the interest costs of depository institutions.
l)uring the 20 years from the mid-I 93Os to the mid-l9SOs, the ceiling rates on time and savings deposits were above market interest rates. In 1957 and 1962, when market interest rates rose near or above the ceiling rates on savings deposits, these ceilings were raised (chart 1). 
3-Month Treasury Bill Rate and Ceiling Rate on Savings Deposits at Commercial Banks
In 1966, interest rate ceilings were imposed on deposits of thrift institutions. Sponsors of the enacting legislation assertedl that interest rates were being driven up by competition for deposits among banks~md thrifts, and that ceiling interest rates on deposits at thrift institutions would stop this escalation. They assumed that by permithng slightly higher ceiling rates at thrift institutions specializing in resiclential mortgage lending, there wouldl be~m adequate supply of credit for residential mortgages at reasonable mortgage interest rates. 4
These controls on interest rates paid by thrift institutions were viewed initially as temporary incasures to (leal with ''unusual circumstances.'' Over time, however, thrift institutions have come to view the difforentials between the ceiling interest rates on their deposits andl those imposed on commercial banks as essential in attracting deposits to Ise used If the differentials in ceiling rates between thrifts and commercial banks are to stimulate the flow of deposits to thrift institutions, ceiling interest rates on sonic categories of deposits at commercial banks must be below market interest rates. If all deposit interest rate ceilings were ttbore market interest rates. the higher ceiling rates at thrift institutions would not induce individuals to hold their deposits there rather than at commercial banks. This would occur because both commercial banks and thrifts would be paving the lower market interest rate to depositors instead of the higher ceiling rates. Since 1966, the ceiling rate on savings (leposits at commercial banks has been below the three-month Treasur% bill rate (a measure of market rates) except 1 Preston Martin. ''A Case for Regulation (4, '' /, n, rual of tI, e Erie, ', , I 
THE EFFECTS OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE CEILINGS
If maintaining (leposit interest rate ceilings below market interest rates, with slightly bigher rates allowecl for thrift institutions, was intended to produce a stable supply of' mortgage credlit available to homebuvers at moderate interest rates, it has fiuilecl to do so. The growth of deposits at thrift institutions has slowed whenever market interest rates have risen above the dleposit ceiling rates.
6 Sam s-Re Snl ts from a Brai narci-lobin M ociei, '' j oi, r, ioI of , tlc, , eq. Credit a, i, l Booking (February 197Sf, 8 Edl wal'di J, Kane, ''SI oi't-Cl ,aii ging the SinaIi S as'c'n: Fe Peril I Goyc'ni tea cut 1) is cninnnati (511 against Sin a! I Savers tIn ring the \'ietnant Wan,'' Journal of . 'tloney, Credit rind Bc, i, king (Noveinher 197(4) The act directs the DIDC to provide for the orderly phase-out and ultimate elimination ofmaximum interest rates that may be paid on time and savings deposits as rapidly as economic conditions warrant. A primary consideration in determining when conditions warrant raising or eliminating these ceilings is the effect of such changes on the safety and soundness of depository institutions. The act lists the following methods the DIDC may use in phasing out ceiling interest rates on deposits:
The phase-out of such limitations may be achieved by the Deregulation Committee by the gradual increase in such limitations applicableto all existing categoriesofaccounts, the complete elimination of the limitations applicable to particularcategories ofaccounts, the citation ofnew categories o accounts not subject to limitations or with limitations set at currentmarket rates, anycombination of the above methods,or any other method."
One limitation imposed on the DIDC is that it may not raise interest rate ceilings on all deposit categories above market interest rates before March 1986.
The DIDC has taken limited actions to raise or eliminate ceilingson deposit interest rates (see table  1 ). The first significant action was to lift caps on ceiling rates for time deposits with maturities of 254 years, which was effective August 1, 1981, The DIDC has also created a new category ofIRA/Keogh account (with minimum maturity of 154 years) that will have no regulated interest rate ceiling as of January 1, 1982.
THE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING REGULATION Q ON INTEREST RATES PAID BY BORROWERS
The effects ofeliminatingceiling rates on deposits cannot be determined by examining the efl~ctsof actions already taken by the DIDC, since few actions to eliminate the ceiling rates have been taken so far. Effects of eliminating deposit ceiling rates on the interest rates paid by borrowers must, therefore, be analyzed by considering the effects of eliminating Regulation Q in the context ofatheory thatdescribes how interest rates are determined.
The Mark-up Theory vs. the Competitive Market Theory
There are several competing theories of how depository institutions determine the interest rates they charge borrowers. The two theories discussed "Ibid., title II, sec. 204(a).
6
DECEMBER 1961 in this section have different implications for the impact of eliminating the ceiling rates on time and savings deposits specified under Regulation Q.
Tue Mark-up Theory -Those who assert that borrowers will be charged higher interest rates due to the elimination of Regulation Q are generally using a mark-up theory: Depository institutions are presumed to determine the interest rates they charge borrowers as a mark-up over the average interest rate they pay on deposits. The average interest rate on deposits will rise as Regulation Q is phased out, unless market interest rates should fortuitously fill below the Regulation Q ceilings currently in elTect.
The mark-up theory, therefore, predicts that borrowers will pay higher interest rates as a consequence of the elimination of Regulation Q.
The Competitive Market Theory -Under this theory, the interaction of several factors influencing both supply and demand determine a market interest rate, which all lenders charge on loans with similar characteristics. Lenders can make few loans at interest rates above the market rate, since borrowers will search for the lowest rate available. Since lenders can make all the loans they wish at the market rate, they have no incentive to lend at interest rates below the market rate.
To describe this theory in more detail, consider the determinants of the market interest rate on a particular category ofcredit -residential mortgage loans. Demand for residential mortgage credit is determined by personal income and the preferences of individuals for housing and for home ownership. Several factors influence the supply of residential mortgage credit. One factor is the interest rates on investments other than residential mortgages. If, for instance, yields rise on U.S. Treasury securities with maturities similar to those of residential mortgages, depository institutions and other suppliers of residential mortage credit will supply less mortgage credit at each level of the mortgage interest rate.
Another important determinant of supply is the interest rate on deposits not subject to Regulation Q ceilings. For example, depository institutions may pay whatever interest rate they wish on time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more. In the competitive market, depository institutions will bid up the interest rates they are willing to pay on deposits free of Regulation Q ceilings until these rates are sufficiently close to their lending rates to eliminate the incentives to make additional loans. Consequently, it is the interest rate that depository 
lb~'~mat
institutions pay on deposits uicaustrunied by rates kr borrowers, ifindividuals are induced to save Regulation 9 that influences the interest rates they more of their income in response to the higher intercharge on loans. est rates available on deposits.
tinder the competitive market theory, a change in
The effects of eliminafing Regulation 9 under the Regulation Q ceilings will affect interest rates on competitive market theory are in sharp contrast to residential mortgages only if it affrcts interest rates the effects under the mark-up theory. The mark-up on unregulated deposits or on alternative invest-theory predicts that the elimination of Regulation 9 ments. One inplication of this theory is that elim-would cause interest rates paid by borrowers to rise, mating Regulation 9 ceilings might reduce interest while the competitive market theory suggests that 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 In addition to these regulations, thrift institutions are also given tax incentives to specialize in residential mortgage lending: The deductions from gross income allocated to bad debt reserves, which are, therefore, not subject to income tax, are larger for institutions that invest more of their assets in mortgages.
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As a result of the higher ceiling interest rates allowable (which attract deposits) and the regulations and tax incentives thatfavor mortgage lending, thrift institutions might charge residential mortgage lendingrates thatare below market interest rates (on securities with characteristics similar to residential mortgages). Eliminating Regulation Q would remove the advantage that thrift institutions have in attracting deposits. As a result, the share of credit channeled to residential mortgages would decline and interest rates on residential mortgages would rise relative to other interest rates. This result is unlikely for several reasons. First, the reactions by other suppliers of credit would tend to offset these effects, as long as non-thrift institutions are making residential mortgage loans as well. If thrift institutions increase the amount of mortgage credit they offer at prevailing interest rates, other lenders will simply reduce the quantity of residential mortgage credit they supply, shifting their investments to other sectors of the credit market. The net result might be no change in mortgage interest rates, but an increase in the proportion of Again, however, an increase in the net supply of residential mortgage credit would not necessarily depress mortgage interest rates relative to yields on alternative investments. The reason is that predictable adjustments in the demand fhr credit would There is a simple method to test whether the residential mortgage market is truly separate from other credit markets. We can determine this by examining the correlation between the difference of the average mortgage interest rate and the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds with the rate of growth in time and savings deposits at mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations. If the correlation is significantly negative -if the spread between the mortgage interest rate and the 10-year bond rate tends to narrow when time and savings deposits at thrift institutions grow at a faster rate -the residential mortgage market is, to some extent, separated from other credit markets. When their deposits increase rapidly, thrift institutions reduce the mortgage interest rate relative to other interest rates in order to acquire enough residential mortgages to retain the tax advantages from specializing in mortgage lending.
In fact, the correlation between the interest rate spread and the growth rate of time and savings deposits at thrift institutions is positive. Using monthly observations from January 1968 through July 1981, the correlation coefficient is 0.234, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. Using quarterly averages for 111968 through 1111981, the correlation coefficient is 0.262, which is not stattistiailly significant at the five percent level.
This resultconfirms the conclusion reached in the previous section. The competitive market theory is consistent with the actual behavior ofinterest rates. Therefore, eliminating Regulation Q would not affect mortgage interest rates adversely.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTEREST RATES OF ALL SAVERS CERTIFICATE S
The analysis presented above has implications for the effects of the All Savers Certificate (ASC) program on interest rates paid by borrowers at depository institutions. ASCs are special time deposits with maturities of one year. The ceiling rate on ASCs is equal to 70 percent of the average yield set in the most recent auction of one-yearTreasury securities.' 3 Individuals may declare up to $1,000 in interest on ASCs tax free (up to $2,000 on joint returns).
Depository institutions issuing ASCs are receiving deposits at interest rates below market rates. For individuals subject to relatively high marginal tax rates, the tax-free yield on ASCs is greater than the after-tax return on many alternative investments. 
Depository institutions

CONCLUSIONS
Under the directives of the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee is in the process of lifting interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits. That committee has taken some steps to raise the ceilings, but the most significant actions to eliminate the ceilings on deposit interest rates are yet to come. Some supporters of ceilings on deposit interest rates claim that eliminating the ceilings will cause depository institutions to raise the interest rates they charge borrowers. An analysis of interest rates does not support this view. Interest rates paid by borrowers are determined by market rates that are exempt from Regulation Q ceilings. Consequently, elimination of Regulation Q ceilings will not cause loan rates to rise, but may cause them to decline if depositors save more with higher deposit interest rates. Profits of depository institutions will not decline by the full amount ofthe increase in interest expense resulting from eliminating Regulation Q, since these institutions will eliminate some noninterest costs that were incurred to attract deposits when Regulation Q ceilings were binding.
Similar implications also hold forthe effects ofthe All Savers Certificate program on interest rates paid by borrowers. Although depository institutions are required to invest at least 75 percent of hinds raised by issuing All Savers Certificates in housing and agricultural loans, that requirement is unlikely to result in lower interest rates on such loans relative to other market interest rates. 
